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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON LITIGA-
TION: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND REMEDIES
Bruce Zagaris*
INTRODUCTION
To seek redress for a denial of rights, prisoners may employ
a number of legal remedies including: tort suits for damages
against corrections officials or against the state or federal govern-
ment; suits for damages or injunctions against state officials under
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 18711 (hereinafter Civil Rights
Act or section 1983); mandamus against prison officials; writs of
habeas corpus; and class actions for damages or injunctive relief.
A novel remedy, pursued by the inmates of the Attica Cor-
rectional Facility, was a class action in which they sought to compel
state and federal prosecution of prison authorities who allegedly
violated the constitutional rights of prisoners during the Attica riots
of 1971.2 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without
resolving the question of standing,3 affirmed the district court's re-
fusal to interfere with prosecutorial discretion to bring indictments
on the federal or state level.4 The circuit court's unwillingness
to formulate judicial standards for review of prosecutorial discre-
tion may deprive prisoners of the protection of the criminal law.5
This article will trace recent important legal developments
delineating remedies available to prisoners whose civil rights have
been violated. The two principal means of seeking federal judi-
cial review of internal state prison practices have been habeas
* B.A., George Washington University, 1969; J.D., George Washington
University, 1972; LL.M., George Washington University, 1973; Member of Idaho
Bar and Oregon Bar.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1973).
3. Id. at 378-79. Usually an individual does not have standing to challenge
the prosecution of another. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
4. 477 F.2d at 382-83. But see Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Re-
evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion and its Potential for Abuse,
21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 498 (1972).
5. Cf. Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963) (mandamus
unavailable to compel the Attorney General to prosecute police for violation of
Civil Rights Act); Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes,
74 YALE L.J. 1297 (1967).
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corpus petitions6 and civil rights suits under section 1983. Al-
though in most cases these two statutory remedies are equally
available, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Preiser v. Rodriguez' has placed significant limitations upon pris-
oners' use of the Civil Rights Act. This article will discuss the
implications of the Preiser decision and its impact on the subse-
quent strategy of prison litigation. In addition, the increasing use
of the class action suit, encouraged by the possibility of awards
of attorneys' fees under the emerging "private attorney general"
doctrine, will be considered.
TORT SUITS
Prisoners traditionally have relied on tort suits to recover for
injuries caused by the negligence of prison officials. 8  The courts
ordinarily have used the tort standard of due care to determine
whether prison officials have jeopardized the safety of prisoners,
who must rely on their wardens for adequate food, shelter, cloth-
ing, medical attention and protection from physical attack.9 When
the duty of care owed to inmates is defined by statute, suits can
be brought against prison officials for noncompliance with the stat-
utory directives.' 0
Tort actions for negligence have generally proved ineffective.
The suspension by many states of prisoners' civil rights during im-
prisonment has been interpreted by a number of courts to pre-
clude the right of an inmate to commence a legal action, except
to challenge an original conviction." The practical problems of
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
7. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Asher v. Cabell, 50 F. 818, 827 (5th Cir. 1892); Indiana ex
rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48 (D. Ind. 1899); Magenheimer v. State ex rel. Dalton,
120 Ind. App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950); Smith v. Miller, 241 Iowa 625, 40
N.W.2d 597 (1950); Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 P. 819 (1894); Ratliff
v. Stanley, 244 Ky. 819, 821-22, 7 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (1928); O'Dell v. Good-
sell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W.2d 906 (1948); Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49
P. 927 (1897); Annot. 14 A.L.R.2d 353 (1950).
9. Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 326, 124 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1962);
Kendrick v. Adamson, 51 Ga. App. 402, 403, 180 S.E. 647, 648 (1935). See
also Appeal of Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N.E. 560 (1906); Farmer v. State
ex rel. Russell, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955); State ex rel. Morris v.
National Surety Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S.W.2d 581 (1931); Kusah v. McCorkle,
100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023 (1918).
10. See, e.g., McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.2d 591 (Sup.
Ct.), appeal denied, 302 N.Y. 950, 98 N.E.2d 117 (1950); Smith v. Slack, 125
W. Va. 812, 26 S.E.2d 387 (1943); Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W.2d
230 (1928). Contra, O'Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N.E. 371 (1894);
Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A.2d 220 (1961). See also State ex rel.
Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959); Williams v. Adams, 85
Mass. (3 Allen) 171 (1894).
11. See, e.g., Snebold v. Justice Court, 201 Cal. App. 2d 152, 19 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1962); In re Robinson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (1952). See
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stale evidence, imperfect memories, unavailable witnesses, 2 and
the suspect credibility of convicts' testimony make the inmates'
burden of proof difficult to meet.'1
If an inmate with a cause of action against a prison guard
is to recover a significant monetary judgment, he must establish
the government's liability under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, since most guards are judgment proof.' 4 However, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity-the notion that a governmental body
may not be sued without its consent-must still be considered.
Sovereign immunity can shield governmental bodies from liabil-
ity.15
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court held, in United
States v. Muniz,' 6 that under the Federal Tort Claims Act'7 pris-
oners may recover damages from the federal government for per-
sonal injuries caused by the negligence of federal prison employ-
ees. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia extended
Muniz, holding that a federal prisoner could sue the United States
-under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained while in
the custody of local authorities in a local jail.' The Muniz deci-
sion, however, was limited by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Demko.1 In Demko the federal statute,20 providing prisoners
compensation from a federal fund for injuries incurred during
prison employment, was deemed the exclusive remedy for such
injuries. 2' Thus, suits under the Tort Claims Act were barred for
prisoners' work-related injuries.
Prisoners bringing tort claims against a governmental entity
must grapple with additional obstacles. Intentional torts, such as
battery, are excluded from the tort claims which may be brought
against governmental bodies under the Tort Claims Act.22 Fur-
generally Note, California Entity Immunity from Tort Claims by Prisoners, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 573, 573-74 (1968).
12. Convicts are often released or transferred from the plaintiff's prison facil-
ity.
13. L. SINGER & R. GOLDFARB, AFTER CONVICTION 437 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as SINGER].
14. Id.
15. Approximately one third of the states recently have abrogated sovereign
immunity through statute or judicial decision. See Van Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 ILL. L.F. 919; Morris, The Disappear-
ing Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability, 26 G.B.J. 435
(1964); Comment, Judicial Abrogation of Governmental and Sovereign Immunity,
78 DICK. L. REV. 365, 366-70 (1973).
16. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1970).
18. Close v. United States, 397 F.2d 686, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
19. 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
21. 385 U.S. at 153.
22. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (exemptions to
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thermore, statutes authorizing these suits often exclude causes of
action arising out of official conduct that is prescribed by statute
or administrative regulation, or that lies within the discretion of
the governmental officials.23 Often prison officials contend suc-
cessfully that the acts in question were discretionary, and that to
hold them responsible for such acts would unfairly circumscribe
their ability to govern, thereby endangering the security of the in-
stitution.24  Despite the numerous obstacles, inmates recently
have successfully employed civil damage suits to obtain compensa-
tion and deter prison officials from flagrant violation of prisoners'
rights.25
MANDAMUS
By obtaining a writ of mandamus a prisoner may compel the
prison authorities to take specific action to vindicate his civil rights.
Mandamus may be used to control ministerial (non-discretionary)
acts and to require officials to exercise their discretion. However,
the manner in which this discretion is exercised is not subject to
review by mandamus.2 6 The difficulty in applying mandamus to
specific instances and in overcoming other technical requirements
has limited the utility of this remedy.27
Difficulties are also encountered when mandamus is brought
to force wardens to follow standards imposed by statute. 28  These
statutes tend to be so general 29 that non-compliance is as hard to
liability: "Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.").
23. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, id. § 2680, which provides:
The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
24. SINGER, supra note 13 at 440.
25. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(transfer of prisoner from one institution to another in violation of his right
of due process gave rise to damage suit under § 1983 for compensatory damages
and lost wages); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (con-
finement of prisoner to punitive segregation for indefinite period of time gave
rise to punitive as well as compensatory damages).
26. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.09 (1958).
27. Id.
28. See Singer & Goldfarb, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 175, 266 (1970).
29. Id. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2652 (West 1970), which reads in part:
It shall be unlawful to use in the prisons, any cruel or unusual punish-
ment or to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever
which would injure or impair the health of the prisoner.
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prove, as compliance is to order. In addition, the exhaustion of
administrative remedies must precede any mandamus action."0
Various federal writs in the nature of mandamus are avail-
able to the prisoner in federal prison.3 ' In 1962, Congress con-
ferred original jurisdiction on all federal district courts over any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer, employee
or any agency of the United States to perform a duty owed 'to a
petitioner.32  The Supreme Court, however, in Panama Canal Co.
v. Grace Line 3 has limited mandamus to those situations which
clearly involve no exercise of discretion by a government official.
Furthermore, a federal court has no jurisdiction to order manda-
mus against a state official. 34
SUITS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Recently the Federal Civil Rights Act (section 1983)31 has
been the most effective device for redressing prisoners' grievances
when state officers are involved. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,36 the Supreme Court rejuve-
nated this long dormant statute. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit dismissed, for failure to state a cause of action, a
section 1983 suit against Chicago police officers for the warrant-
less search of a family residence and detention of the father. 7
The majority Supreme Court opinion held that the purpose of sec-
tion 1983 was to provide a federal remedy for violations of consti-
tutional rights by officials acting under color of state law.38 A
federal court thus has jurisdiction over any claim alleging violation
of due process or equal protection rights. 39
30. See Hammond v. Hull, 131 F.2d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 777 (1943).
31. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
33. 356 U.S. 309, 316-18 (1958).
34. In re Wolenski, 324 F.2d 309 (3rd Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
36. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
37. Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
39. Id. at 171.
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Since section 1983 is meant "to provide a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, [is] not avail-
able in practice,"4 federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
under section 1983 over claims that could also be brought under
state law.4' To avail himself of a federal forum, an inmate must
allege deprivation, under color of state law, of a federal statutory
right or a constitutional right guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment.42
Official action conducted under color of state law has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to include the ac-
tions of a private person who "is a willful participant in joint ac-
tivity with the State or its agents."43  Therefore, trustee prisoners
and private persons acting in concert with state correctional of-
ficers would come within the purview of the Act.
Federal prisoners, however, have been unable to utilize sec-
tion 1983, since this section applies only to activities carried out
under color of state law. Therefore, it cannot be used to obtain
judicial relief against federal officials. 44
Damages
Under the Civil Rights Act an aggrieved petitioner may seek
both legal and equitable remedies. 45 Federal courts recently have
awarded compensatory damages to prisoners in cases brought
under the Act; for example, inmates have been awarded damages
for physical and mental injuries suffered while they were kept in
solitary confinement.46 Despite the awards of damages obtained
in these cases, sovereign immunity47 may be a defense to a section
1983 action, if the state law recognizes the immunity, and the
factual situation involves ministerial activity.48
40. Id. at 174.
41. Id. at 183.
42. Outzs v. Maryland National Insurance Co., 470 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.
1972).
43. U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (federal prosecution of a Mis-
sissippi sheriff, patrolman and several private individuals for conspiring to deprive
three civil-rights workers of their civil rights under color of state law).
44. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1962).
45. Any person who deprives a citizen of his constitutional rights "shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
46. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd
in part, modified in part, rev'd in part sub. noma. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127,
143-44 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
47. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
48. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-66, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds sub. nom. Distr. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1972);
Baker v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1200, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Injunctions
Even where damage suits against government entities can be
brought, such after-the-fact adjudications do not satisfy the convict
who needs to resolve his grievances quickly and in advance of any
further violation of his civil rights. The injunction, by which a
court orders either affirmative action or the cessation of oppressive
practices, is the most effective tool ,to accomplish the convict's ob-
jectives. Despite the effectiveness of this form of relief, injunc-
tions on behalf of prisoners seldom issue from state courts. 49
Injunctive relief is available in federal district courts under
section 1983 to prevent future violations of prisoners' constitu-
tional and federal statutory rights, despite state statutory provisions
suspending a prisoners' capacity to bring such a civil action.
Where unconstitutional prison practices are systematically em-
ployed, the courts may, in class actions, require prison officials to
develop and propose for approval by the court a new plan of prison
operation, or file regular reports with the court regarding progress
made in eliminating violations of prisoners' civil rights.5 °
Exhaustion of State Remedies
It is now undisputed that exhaustion of state judicial or ad-
ministrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a suit under the Civil
Rights Act.5 For many years prisoners have been successful in
bypassing state remedies because the remedies have been unavail-
able either in theory or in practice. 52 Confusion has arisen, how-
ever, over whether litigants bringing suits under the Civil Rights
Act are excused from exhausting state remedies in every case, or
only in those cases where application for relief through state proc-
esses clearly would be futile. 3
The recent case of McCray v. Burrell,54 a federal district
court decision requiring inmates to pursue state administrative
remedies before bringing a federal civil rights suit, has the poten-
49. See SINGER, supra note 13 at 450, in which the authors note that they
were able to find no reported decisions in which a state court had issued an
injunction on behalf of prisoners against prison officials.
50. See Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 833 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
51. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); Edwards v. Schmidt, 321
F. Supp. 68, 75-6 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
52. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (per curiam) (§ 1983
suit was available since the remedies afforded by the state, requiring inmates
to take their problems to the "Classification and Treatment Clinic," the superin-
tendent of the institutions, the Deputy Commissioner of the Corrections, the Com-
missioner of Corrections and, as a final appeal, the state attorney general, were
determined to be futile).
53. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 841 (1970).
54. 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973).
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tial to cut drastically the number of cases challenging prison condi-
tions handled initially by the federal courts. In McCray, the court
announced that the State of Maryland had established a truly
workable system for administrative processing of prisoner griev-
ances that would result in prompt and meaningful relief.55 The
court expressed concern over the staggering increase in federal
court caseloads due to prisoners' rights complaints. For instance,
the plaintiff himself had filed 36 suits with the court."0 To de-
termine the adequacy of an available state administrative remedy,
a threefold test was set forth. First, the state remedy must be
scrutinized on its face to determine whether it contains forbidden
indicia of pre-judgment, rendering it violative of due process.
Second, the remedy must be adequate in practice, 'that is, it must
be administered in an even-handed manner. Third, the extent
of the state's interest in the subject matter of federal litigation
must be considered in order to minimize federal-state friction. 7
The Maryland statute5" scrutinized in McCray set up an In-
mate Grievance Commission to receive complaints from state pris-
oners, hold hearings where complaints were found meritorious,
and order changes. If changes were ordered, the order would
be sent to the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services,
who could affirm, reverse or modify it.59 The complaining inmate
could seek review of a final adverse ruling in a state court.6 The
statute provided that "[n]o court shall be required to entertain
an inmate's grievance or complaint within the jurisdiction of the
Inmate Grievance Commission unless and until the complainant
has exhausted the remedies as provided in this section."'"
In McCray the federal court concurred with a recent opinion
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland which stated:
We think that the Inmate Grievance Commission Act and
the implementing rules adopted by the Commission provide a
simple and workable procedure by which every person in
confinement who has, or thinks he has, a grievance or com-
plaint can be heard promptly, fairly and fully, and obtain
a judicial review with respect to his constitutional and statu-
tory rights.62
The McCray court found that despite the Commission's lack
of authority to award monetary damages, the state administrative
55. Id. at 1200.
56. Id. at 1193.
57. Id. at 1201.
58. ANN. CODE OF MD., Art. 41, § 204F (Cum. Supp. 1974).
59. Id. § 204F(e).
60. Id. § 204F(e), (f).
61. Id,. § 204F(i).
62. State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 144, 297 A.2d 265, 282 (Md. App. 1972).
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procedure must still be exhausted, as "there is no sense of imme-
diacy attendant upon the awarding of money damages to redress
particular deprivations of constitutional rights.
68
The import of the McCray decision, coming at a time when
many state and federal officials wish to curtail prisoner suits under
the Civil Rights Act, is to sanction the State's establishment of its
own machinery to process inmate grievances. Exhaustion of pre-
sumptively prompt and fair administrative procedures would then
become, as in McCray, a necessary condition to a section 1983
suit by a prisoner.
Two portions of the McCray decision are particularly disturb-
ing. The first concerns one of the tests used by the court to deter-
mine whether a state administrative remedy is "adequate"-the
extent of a state's interest in the subject matter of litigation.64 Al-
though the test serves as one criterion to determine whether a fed-
eral court should exercise jurisdiction, it has not been, nor should
it be, determinative of jurisdiction in the usual suit challenging
prison conditions. Indeed, it is the very interest of the state or
state official in depriving a citizen of his rights that provides the
rationale for federal intervention. For example, it must be sup-
posed that the state's interest in "efficient" prison administration
will frequently collide with the prisoners' due process rights. The
misuse of the state interest standard would be serious indeed; fed-
eral courts should not curtail the availability of section 1983 suits
by placing their imprimatur on inadequate state procedures in the
name of so-called "state interest."
The other objectionable portion of the McCray decision is the
holding that an inmate seeking monetary damages must first ex-
haust state remedies which do not provide for monetary relief.
Such a prerequisite makes it unlikely that a Maryland inmate can
obtain prompt financial redress under the Civil Rights Act for an
injury suffered at the hands of a prison official. Under the
McCray decision, the potential dilution of an inmate's federal
remedies becomes apparent.
Declaratory Judgments
A declaratory judgment, often requested simultaneously with
a prayer for injunctive relief, defines the rights and obligations of
the parties to a case. The federal court will issue a declaratory
judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act6 5 only if there is
an actual, immediate dispute between the prisoner and his named
63. 367 F. Supp. at 1209.
64. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
[Vol. 14
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defendant or defendants. There must be, in short, a definite
threat of interference with defined rights of the prisoner. 6  Once
such a declaratory judgment is rendered declaring a prison con-
dition unconstitutional, prison officials decide what particular ac-
tion is required to alleviate the situation.67 The court may also
retain jurisdiction where additional relief may be necessary in the
future.6"
Abstention
The doctrine of abstention-by which a federal court may,
in its discretion, stay or dismiss its proceedings until an issue of
state law is authoritively determined by a state court-should not
be applied by itself to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction
in prisoner rights actions. Cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court and lower federal courts have held that both state
equitable and legal remedies need not be exhausted before fed-
eral relief is sought.6 9 Indeed, in prison cases where federal con-
stitutional issues, rather than unresolved questions of state law,
necessarily govern any decision, abstention is particularly inappro-
priate.
HABEAS CORPUS
Traditionally, habeas corpus has been the principal means by
which prisoners have attacked the legal basis for their incarcera-
tion.7" This writ, carried over from the English common law, was
first used by state courts. The writ is provided for in the Consti-
tution,71 and, in 1867, Congress authorized the use of habeas
corpus by federal courts.72
The applicability of the writ of habeas corpus has gradually
expanded. For many years habeas corpus could be employed by
a prisoner only to challenge the legality of his original conviction;
73
66. See United Public Works v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947).
67. See Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 833-34 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970), which states:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment
or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
69. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); United States ex rel.
Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See also SINGER, supra
note 13, at 62-66.
70. See Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D.
179, 179-82 (1948); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHNS
L.R. 55, 58-61 (1934).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
72. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Today, the writ is codi-
fied in 28 U.S.C. 2241-55 (1970).
73. United States ex rel. Binion v. United States Marshal, 188 F. Supp. 905,
905-08 (D. Nev. 1960), aff'd 292 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1961) (habeas corpus
will not issue where there is any period of imprisonment that petitioner is legally
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 14
but in 1944 Coffin v. Reichard74 a federal court of appeals au-
thorized habeas corpus to remedy unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Since Coffin, courts have made the writ available
to any prisoner who raises a proper legal challenge to his prison
confinement or treatment.75 Thus, in Johnson v. Avery,"8 the
United States Supreme Court approved a prisoner's use of habeas
corpus to challenge his solitary confinement, which was imposed
for the violation of a prison regulation. It was not necessary for
the inmate to seek total release from the prison. Subsequently,
federal and state courts have used habeas corpus to remedy any
gross mistreatment of prisoners. 7
Even though courts have expanded the scope of habeas cor-pus, the practical application of 'the remedy in federal courts is
difficult and time consuming. 78 The writ can be used only after
alternative remedies have been exhausted. 79  Hence, a state pris-
oner may not bring a federal habeas corpus action until:
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, or [until] there is either an absence of
available State corrective .process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner. 80
The federal courts have found this requirement of exhausting state
remedies applicable to suits challenging conditions within a
prison.8'
obliged to serve). See also Snow v.. Roche, 143 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir.), cert.den., 323 U.S. 788 (1944) (complaint alleging inadequate food and medical treat-
ment dismissed for failure to question legality of confinement); Robinson v. Di-
rector, 238 A.2d 124, 125 (Md. App. 1968).
74. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. den., 325 U.S. 887 (1945).75. See, e.g., Commowealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110 (Pa.Sup. Ct. 1971) (habeas corpus should not be entertained merely to correct prison
conditions, but where confinement is cruel and callous the courts may grant relief
through habeas corpus).
76. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
77. State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 186 S.E.2d 220, 231 (W. Va. App. 1972)(habeas corpus is appropriate to secure relief from conditions of imprisonment
which constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment tothe Constitution of the United States); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick,280 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1971) (habeas corpus available to seek relieffrom confinement under conditions which amount to cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1968), afj'd417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 387 U.S. 963 (1970) (permitted use
of habeas corpus is to reach and prevent mistreatment of prisoners in custody
where such mistreatment amounts to cruel and unusual punishment).
78. Singer & Goldfarb, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 175, 272 (1970).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970); Johnson v. Dye, 71 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa.1947), rev'd, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd per curiam, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
81. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855, 856 (S.D.N.Y.1961) (state prison authorities withheld letter from prisoner to U.S. AttorneyGeneral's Commission; prisoner's failure to show exhaustion of state remedies
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Inmates with grievances regarding conditions of confinement
may sometimes circumvent this exhaustion requirement. If state
law does not provide for any redress for violation of a right guar-
anteed by federal law, the state judicial system may be bypassed. 2
Furthermore, if state remedies are illusory because of the virtually
insuperable procedural difficulties involved, direct resort to the
federal system is permissible.83 At present, few departments of
correction have procedures for resolving prisoners' grievances. If
effective administrative complaint procedures similar to the Mary-
land statute scrutinized in McCray v. Burrell4 are developed in
the future, prisoners will be required to use these administrative
channels before taking their grievances to court.8 5
PREISER V. RODRIGUEZ
The Preiser Decision
To avoid the complications and delays inherent in exhausting
administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
and to gain the advantages of liberal discovery proceedings,8 6 ex-
pansive class action rules and the broad equitable powers of fed-
eral courts under the Civil Rights Act, prisoners' attorneys have
brought an ever increasing number of prisoners' rights suits under
section 1983. Although Preiser v. Rodriguez87 represents a wa-
tershed in the judicial attempt to define the relationship between
the federal habeas corpus statute and section 1983, the Supreme
Court's majority opinion failed to clear the already muddied waters
surrounding this issue.
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 precluded consideration of petition for writ of
habeas corpus); Barone v. Warden, 209 F. Supp. 309, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (in-
mate alleging denial of his demand for access to legal materials was required
to appeal lower state court's dismissal of habeas corpus petition to the state su-
preme court despite an opinion from a lower court that the state code did not
authorize the appeal). But see Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 74-5 (W.D.
Wis. 1971 ) (where juvenile inmates challenged validity of transfer to adult penal
institutions, exhaustion of state remedies was unnecessary).
82. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949); See Note, Effect of the
Federal Constitution in Requiring State Remedies, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1143
(1953).
83. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 523-4 (2d Cir. 1967).
84. 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973). See text accompanying notes 58-
61 supra.
85. Exhaustion of federal administrative remedies has been required in Paden
v. United States, 430 F.2d 882, 883 '(5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Blackwell, 421
F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir. 1970); Hess v. Blackwell, 409 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir.
1969); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 386, 388 (10th Cir. 1966).
86. Discovery provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is avail-
able as a matter of course in suits brought under the Civil Rights Act. In habeas
corpus proceedings, however, limited discovery is available and only upon appli-
cation to the court. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298-9 (1969). Also
see Hirshkop, Crisman & Millemann, Litigating an Affirmative Prisoners' Rights
Action, 11 AM. CR. L. REV. 39, 55-7 (1972).
87. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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Preiser involved consolidated appeals of three New York
State prisoners who originally had filed complaints in federal court
under Section 1983.88 Their complaints challenged the adminis-
trative procedures leading to their placement in solitary confine-
ment and deprivation of previously earned "good conduct" reduc-
tions from their indeterminate sentences. While each prisoner's
complaint under the Civil Rights Act was combined with a petition
for habeas corpus, the district court in each case had treated the
habeas petitions as only "incidental" to insuring full relief if the
prisoners triumphed on their civil rights claim.89 The district
court held that in each instance the prison's procedures were an
unconstitutional violation of the prisoners' due process rights, and
ordered the restoration of good conduct time which had been lost
by the plaintiffs. 9° As a result of this restoration, most of the pris-
oners became eligible for immediate parole. 91
The state appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 92 contending that the object of the plain-
tiffs' suit had been release, not redress for administrative abuse,
and that therefore they should properly have ptitioned for writs
of habeas corpus. Under section 2254(b) of the federal habeas
corpus statute,93 prisoners first must exhaust available state rem-
edies before filing writs in federal court; the plaintiffs had failed
to do this. The state argued that the district court lacked juris-
diction under the Civil Rights Act since the federal habeas corpus
statute preempted a section 1983 action. Furthermore, no juris-
diction would lie under habeas corpus because state remedies had
not been exhausted as required. The circuit court accepted the
state's argument and reversed the holding of the district court.94
Later, after two other prisoners appealed, the Second Circuit or-
dered that the case be reheard en banc, and affirmed the district
court decision. 5 A majority of the court of appeals believed that
the Supreme Court's decision in Wilwording v. Swenson96 author-
ized prisoners to elect whether to bring their claims in habeas cor-
pus or under section 1983.17 In Wilwording the Supreme Court,
in essence, held that prisoner complaints about conditions and ar-
bitrary procedures could be brought under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. 8
88. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
89. Id. at 628.
90. Id. at 632.
91. Id.
92. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir. 1971).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
94. 451 F.2d at 731.
95. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1972) (en banc).
96. 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam).
97. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1972).
98. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250-51 (1971).
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The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Preiser, authored
by Justice Stewart, reversed the appellate court and held that
under the circumstances of the consolidated cases, habeas corpus
was the sole remedy available to the prisoners; their failure to ex-
haust state remedies precluded jurisdiction by the federal district
court.99 The Court characterized the issue as whether, under the
Wilwording rationale, a state prisoner may bring a civil rights suit
under section 1983 to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional dep-
rivation of good conduct credits where restoration of those credits
would result either in his immediate release from prison or in
shortening his period of confinement. 100 The court answered this
question in the negative, ruling broadly that it was the intent of
Congress that habeas corpus be the sole remedy for prisoners
seeking either release or shortening of their term of confine-
ment.'
01
Suits for immediate or accelerated release were characterized
as being within the "core" of habeas corpus, necessitating fulfill-
ment of the specific requirements of a federal habeas corpus stat-
ute, including exhaustion of state remedies.' 02 The limits of the
Court's concept of the "core" or "essence" of habeas corpus are
still not clear. Moreover, it should be noted that even after
Preiser, suits seeking only damages for illegal actions by state of-
ficials must be brought under section 1983 and may not be
brought as habeas corpus actions.' 0 3  Consequently, suits chal-
lenging the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or
length of custody can be brought under section 1983, although
the Court left open the possibility that habeas corpus might pro-
vide a supplemental remedy.'
0 4
The Preiser decision represents at least a partial setback for
the prison reform movement. Federal judges with a predisposi-
tion against prison suits will use Preiser to channel most prison
litigation within the ambit of the habeas corpus statute with its bur-
densome exhaustion requirement, at least where reduction of
terms or outright release could arguably result. Certain Civil
Rights Act suits seem clearly barred by Preiser: suits challenging
disciplinary procedures resulting in loss of good time, since a suc-
cessful challenge would result in earlier release for a prisoner;
99. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973).
100. Id. at 482.
101. Id. at 488-90.
102. Id. at 484.
103. Id. at 494. The Court specifically reaffirmed four state prisoner cases
in which section 1983 jurisdiction was upheld, on the "understanding" that "a
section 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of the prison life, but not to the fact
or length of custody." Id. at 499.
104. Id.
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challenges to parole revocation, since a favorable decision would
reinstate parole; and suits seeking release for pretrial detainees.
Hopefully, Preiser will be limited to those specific situations where
the challenge is the fact or duration of confinement and the relief
requested is an immediate release from imprisonment.
The well-reasoned dissenting opinion in Preiser,0 5 authored
by Justice Brennan, observed that the majority had misapplied the
facts of that case to the newly announced standard-restricting
prisoners to the remedy of habeas corpus when shortening of the
confinement period or "release" was sought. As one commenta-
tor has noted, 0 6 all three prisoners in Preiser challenged not the
actual deprivation of credits, but rather the summary, ex parte
manner in which these credits were revoked. Release in this case
was no more than a fortuitous or incidental consequence of the
procedural challenge. 07  In addition, total release was not in-
volved since the inmates would still be on parole. In other words,
the plaintiffs were not escaping their sentences: "[t]he form of
their custody was simply altered."'' 08
The potential release of prisoners made possible by section
1983 suits may persuade some judges to refuse to hear such suits
on the ground of preemption by the federal habeas corpus rem-
edy.'0 9 But the facts of Preiser must be recalled; the remote and
collateral nature of the release in that case certainly should not
be used to rationalize the conclusion that any suit, based upon un-
lawful prison conditions, which potentially could result in release,
must be brought solely under a writ of habeas corpus.
Cogent arguments can be made to limit Preiser. Only when
a prisoner seeks direct -and outright release from unlawful custody,
and not when he seeks improved treatment, should he be required
to pursue habeas corpus. The most effective support for this
proposition lies in the four state prisoner cases discussed in the
majority opinion in Preiser,"° in which section 1983 jurisdiction
was specifically reaffirmed. Additional support for this proposi-
tion can be found in a recent federal district court decision, Gomez
v. Miller."'
The four state prisoner cases approved in Preiser-cases
which did not require the federal habeas corpus remedy-follow
105. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of Habeas Corpus": The Supreme Court
and the Limitations on a Prisoner's Right to Sue; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 9 CRIM.
L. BULL. 518, 525-26 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin].
107. Id. at 525.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 411 U.S. at 498.
111. 341 F. Supp. 323, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Miller
v. Gomez, 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
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a discernible pattern. In Cooper v. Pate,"2 a prisoner was held
to have stated a cause of action under section 1983 where he al-
leged that he had been denied permission to purchase specific re-
ligious publications and denied other privileges enjoyed by his fel-
low inmates. In Houghton v. Shafer"' a complaint was held to
state a cause of action under section 1983 where a prisoner al-
leged that legal materials which he was using to pursue an appeal
were confiscated by prison authorities. Wilwording v. Swenson" 4
involved a challenge by prisoners to the living conditions and dis-
ciplinary measures imposed upon them while in the maximum se-
curity section of the prison. The Supreme Court found that the
complaint stated a claim under both section 1983 and the federal
habeas corpus statute." 5 In Haines v. Kerner,"6 section 1983
jurisdiction was upheld in a claim for damages arising out of an
allegedly unconstitutional solitary confinement. The Preiser
Court distinguished each of these recent Supreme Court decisions
by characterizing them as involving prisoners' claims relating
solely to the states' alleged unconstitutional treatment of inmates
while in confinement."
17
In Gomez v. Miller'" plaintiffs challenged the New York
commitment procedures for the mentally ill in a section 1983 suit
before a three-judge federal district court. Plaintiffs, persons in-
dicted for various felonies but untried, challenged their confine-
ment in a hospital for the "criminally insane" run by the Depart-
ment of Corrections, since their commitment was based only upon
a finding of incompetence to stand trial. They contended that the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment required the state to prove in a jury trial that they were
"dangerous" before they could be committed to a "prison" hos-
pital, which was inferior to civilian hospitals. The state statutes
in question provided for a jury trial on the question of dangerous-
ness in all cases except those of indicted felons found incompetent
to stand trial."' The plaintiffs, however, did not challenge the
state's right to commit them to a civilian hospital merely on a find-
ing of incompetence. 20
The district court rejected the state's contention that the
habeas corpus statute was controlling. The court noted that grant-
112. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
113. 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiamn).
114. 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 250-51.
116.- 404 U.S. .519 (1972) (per curiam).
117. 411 U.S. at 498-9.
118. 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
119. N.Y. CPL 730.10 et seq. (McKinney 1971); N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC.
§ 662-b (McKinney 1971). "
120. 341 F. Supp. at 326,
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ing the relief sought would result at best in a transfer to a civilian
hospital and not an outright release.' 2 ' The Supreme Court af-
firmed without opinion, 122 subsequent to its decision in Preiser.
The Gomez decision supports the use of section 1983 juris-
diction in cases in which the relief sought will not result in an im-
mediate or accelerated release. For example, Gomez arguably
supports section 1983 jurisdiction in the following types of cases:
(1) those in which prisoners object to their unlawful transfer be-
tween prison facilities; (2) those in which prisoners claim that
they have been sentenced to the wrong institution (for example,juveniles contesting incarceration in adult facilities; objections to
special facilities for drug offenders or mentally ill persons); and(3) possibly those cases in which prisoners allege deprivation of
due process in parole-release hearings.
Applications of Preiser to Parole Hearings
In regard to violations of due process in parole-release hear-
ings, a ruling that a prisoner has been denied due process in parole
proceedings will not result in automatic release in all cases. In-
stead, a prisoner cannot be released unless there is an additional
finding by the parole board that the prisoner actually meets the
specific requirements necessary for parole. In contrast, a success-
ful due process challenge to a parole revocation hearing requires
an immediate release of the petitioner and reinstatement of pa-
role. 2 3 Since parole revocation challenges dispute the legality of
incarceration, they fall within the "core" of habeas corpus under
the Preiser ruling; therefore, a section 1983 action will not lie.
Res Judicata
A novel issue presented by Preiser is whether res judicata
will apply in prison suits brought partly under a writ of habeas
corpus, and partly under a section 1983 action. For example, if
the state court in considering the habeas corpus petition reaches
a factual determination adverse to the petitioners, which includes
the same matter litigated in part under section 1983, an issue will
arise as to whether the state habeas corpus determination is resjudicata in a pending section 1983 action. This question has
not yet been decided. In Preiser, the Court merely noted that
a number of lower courts have held principles of res judicata ap-
plicable to section 1983 actions. 1 4  The Court refrained, how-
121. Id. at 328.
122. Miller v. Gomez, 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
123. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 404 U.S. 471 (1972).
124, 411 U.S. at 497.
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ever, from specifically approving these holdings.125
Although a majority of the courts of appeals decisions which
have considered the issue have held res judicata applicable to sec-
tion 1983,126 none of these decisions has addressed the specific
issue which arises from Preiser: whether relitigation under section
1983 is precluded by an adverse state finding of facts determined
in a state habeas corpus proceeding, which plaintiffs were forced
to file as a condition precedent to federal habeas corpus relief.
Several reasons militate against applying res judicata principles to
this situation. First, res judicata is based partly on the rationale
that where litigants voluntarily choose to adjudicate a case in a
certain forum, they should be bound by that choice.' 2 7  This ra-
tionale does not apply where a suit, such as a state habeas corpus
proceeding, is a statutory prerequisite to the plaintiff's pursuit of
further relief. Second, in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners,128 where res judicata issues arose from a fed-
eral court's invocation of the abstention doctrine so as to allow
state courts to rule on issues of state law, the Court distinguished
between voluntary and involuntary submission of federal claims
to state courts.' 29 In so doing, the Court upheld the litigant's right
to preserve federal claims for a federal forum.130 Finally, when
claims are filed simultaneously in federal and state courts, to bar
litigation under section 1983 because -the state court reached a de-
cision first would severely restrict the usefulness of that section.
This result would be anomalous, since section 1983 was enacted
in part to insure the effective protection of individual federal rights
in a federal court.
131
Federal Cases
Since the Preiser decision, a handful of federal court cases
have dealt with challenges to "conditions" of confinement and ef-
forts to obtain prisoner "release." While some decision have fol-
lowed Preiser without question, four recent decisions3 2 are indica-
125. Id. at 497, 509 n.14.
126. See, e.g., Chism v. Price, 457 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1972).
127. See Johnson v. Dept. of Water and Power of City of Los Angeles, 450
F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1072 (1972) (appellant
chose to pursue his remedies through the state administrative and judicial sys-
tems); C.J. Enterprises, Inc. v. Cataldo, 457 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1972)
(appellants elected to litigate the constitutional validity of the ordinance in state
court).
128. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
129. Id. at 418.
130. Id. at 421-2.
131. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
132. Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Wingard v. North
Carolina, 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 F.
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tive of the inconsistent interpretations to which the Preiser case
is subject.
Two of these cases involved challenges by inmates to trans-
fers between prisons. In Hartmann v. Scott,133 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned the district court's dismissal of a pris-
oner's class action,' which sought to declare invalid and enjoin
the enforcement of a Minnesota statute adopting the Interstate
Compact on Mental Health. The plaintiff-inmate in this case was
found to be mentally ill and dangerous, and was civilly committed
in Minnesota in 1951. In 1970, after being transferred to an in-
stitution in Arizona, he escaped. In 1971, he was arrested in Col-
orado for a misdemeanor and was then transported against his will
and without a hearing to Minnesota, where he was reincarcerated
in the Minnesota Security Hospital. In dismissing the inmate's
section 1983 suit, the federal district court, in an unpublished de-
cision anticipating Preiser, found that the relief requested was to-
tally integrated with the claim that plaintiffs detention was illegal
and that such claim, by its very nature, raised the same questions
that must be determined in a habeas corpus action.'3 5
The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the lower
court's view that the inmate's request for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, based on the unconstitutionality of the Minnesota stat-
utes and regulations, could not be separated from his request for
a discharge. The Hartmann court, in a post-Preiser decision, held
that since neither the declaratory nor the injunctive relief sought
by Hartmann would result in release from confinement, he was
free to challenge the statutes in a section 1983 action without first
having exhausted his state remedies.'""
In Sherman v. Lowe, 3 7 an inmate of a state prison brought
a civil rights action seeking both an order returning him to the
city jail pending appeal from his conviction, and monetary dam-
ages for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of his transfer fromjail to prison. The essence of the inmate's complaint was: (1)
that his transfer from jail to state prison was contrary to the sen-
tencing decree of the court and therefore deprived him of due
process; (2) that his transfer was contrary to state law and there-
fore denied him equal protection of the law; and (3) that his
transfer interfered with the medical and hospital treatment he had
Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Sherman v. Lowe, 363 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D. Va.
1973).
133. 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973).
134. Inmate Hartman brought the suit on behalf of himself and all prisoners
confined in the Minnesota state mental hospital.
135. See Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 1973).
136. 488 F.2d at 1222-3.
137. 363 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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been receiving, thereby causing him injuries and inflicting on him
cruel and unusual punishment. 8  The district court dismissed the
suit, holding that the -inmate's claims should have been raised in
a petition for habeas corpus.1 9 The court's ruling was based in
part on unresolved questions of state law and the resulting pro-
priety of federal court abstention.
40
In Wingard v. North Carolina,'41 a section 1983 suit was
brought in which an inmate alleged that his two consecutive ten
year sentences had been improperly treated by state prison offi-
cials as the equivalent of one continuous sentence of twenty years
duration. He therefore claimed that he was being unlawfully de-
nied participation in rehabilitation and other prison programs
which inmates serving sentences of ten years or less may enjoy.
Such treatment, the inmate claimed, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment and denial of due process. He sought by way of relief
an injunction and damages. The state contended that the relief
requested would result in the truncation of the inmate's sentence,
thereby necessitating treatment of the suit as a petition for federal
habeas corpus, which must be dismissed for failure to exhaust state
remedies.' 42 The district court ruled in favor of the inmate. The
court stated that the relief, if granted, would make the inmate el-
igible for parole, but would not constitute an 'actual grant of pa-
role. '4 The court distinguished Preiser by noting that although
the practical and desired result of the inmate's petition was an ear-
lier release from prison, such release was not its sole aim.' 4  The
petition, therefore, did not fall within the parameters of habeas
corpus as outlined by the Supreme Court. The Wingard court
read Preiser as restricting a prisoner to a habeas corpus proceeding
when the only relief sought is immediate or more speedy release
from imprisonment. Inmate W ingard, in contrast, sought the ben-
efits of work release and participation in rehabilitation programs
as well as an accelerated release.
In Mercado v. Rockefeller,"'45 a Civil Rights Act and federal
habeas corpus class action was brought by parolees from a state
training school seeking a determination that the New York statute
providing that a "person in need of supervision" means a juvenile
138. Id. at 1387.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1387.
141. 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
142. Id. at 983.
143. Id.
144. The mixture of objectives of the inmate's suit was depicted in the court's
analysis: "Furthermore, although plaintiff is obviously interested in seeing day-
light as soon as possible, he is also asking for some other relief which is not
confined nor addressed to speedy relief from prison. Id.
145. 363 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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"who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and
beyond the control of parent or other lawful authority"'46 was un-
constitutional. Since the Preiser decision had intervened between
the commencement of the action and its resolution, the plaintiffs
were forced to concede that their section 1983 cause of action was
preempted by the habeas corpus remedy. Treating the suit as
essentially a petition for federal habeas corpus, the district court
dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust state remedies.' 47
All four of the federal cases discussed involved not only chal-
lenges against prison conditions and/or procedures, but also at-
tempts to obtain immediate release or to reduce the period of
confinement. In viewing the four decisions in light of Preiser,
conceptual inconsistencies emerge, which perhaps ultimately can
be explained only in terms of public policy considerations. For
example, in Sherman,'48 had the court heard the inmate's suit,
other prisoners might have been able to bring successful suits
to gain residence in a local jail which was already overcrowded
and unmanageable. Similarly, in Mercado,'49 if the plaintiffs had
prevailed, the result would have been the immediate release of
thousands of juveniles in New York. On the other hand, in the
two cases won by the inmates, the courts appeared to have been
swayed by concern for humane treatment. In Wingard,"0 the
multiple rehabilitative opportunities for the plaintiff-inmate be-
came the crucial issue. In Hartmann,"' the plaintiff previously
had been declared mentally ill; he already had exhausted attempts
to gain release and had proved himself capable of existing in the
outside world following his escape. The conceptual problems al-
ready raised by these four decisions bear out predictions made by
Justice Brennan in the Preiser dissent.15'1 The distinction be-
tween suits in which prisoners seek immediate release-the so-
called "core" of a habeas corpus action-and suits challenging the
oppressive conditions of incarceration, creates an unmanageable
and impractical legal standard with which to judge the propriety of
a particular form of prison litigation. Indeed, in Preiser and in
the four federal cases, the courts could have stressed either release
or conditions of imprisonment as the major issue.
Post-Preiser Strategy
Prisoners' lawyers can take two approaches to avoid the ad-
146. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
147. 363 F. Supp. at 492.
148. Sherman v. Lowe, 363 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D. Va. 1973).
149. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150. Wingard v. North Carolina, 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
151. Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973).
152. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
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verse impact of Preiser. The first avenue is to seek some appro-
priate form of relief other than release whenever possible. For ex-
ample, an attack on disciplinary procedures can include a request
for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief (both restraining
the enforcement of present procedural rules and commanding the
adoption of new ones). This circumspect approach should avoid
the application of -the Preiser rationale. The second approach is
to append, as a matter of course, damage claims in section 1983
complaints. Courts sympathetic to hearing prison reform cases
could justify retention of the entire case on theories of pendent
jurisdiction. Other less receptive courts could exercise jurisdiction
over the damage claim and send the remainder of the suit to state
court, resulting in potential state-federal friction, as well as ineffi-
ciency and duplication. In any event, it appears that Preiser has
not clarified, but rather confused, procedure in prison reform
cases.
CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions have proved to be an especially advantageous
litigation tool for prisoner plaintiffs.' 53  Plaintiffs and defendants,
however, must be chosen with care in prison litigation to insure
that procedural and substantive advantages are utilized to the full-
est. Moreover, the increasing tendency of the courts to award at-
torneys' fees -to the "private attorney general" provides an addi-
tional incentive for the filing of class actions. The Preiser case
should not serve to deter such suits.
Class actions often provide the most practical means for pris-
oners to attack widespread unconstitutional prison practices.1
54
Albeit expensive and cumbersome, 15  the benefits of class actions
are numerous. With a class of plaintiffs, a whole suit cannot be
rendered moot by the release of an inmate.15 6 Further, the in-
volvement of numerous plaintiffs permits extensive discovery, 
57
with the result that more evidence will be admissible at trial. 58
The relief available to a class also tends to be broader in scope
than the personal redress permitted an individual. 59 In addition,
153. See Hirschkop, Crisman & Milleman, Litigating an Affirmative Pris-
oners' Rights Action, 11 AMER. CR. L. REV. 39, 44-45 (1972) (hereinafter
cited as Hirschkop).
154. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (prisoners'
individual claims did not present basis for individual relief, but since conditions
at the prison as a whole constituted cruel and unusual punishment, prison officials
ordered to present plans for correction of all unconstitutional conditions).
155. Hirschkop, supra, at 45.
156. Id.
157. See text accompanying notes 166-67 infra.
158. Hirschkop, supra, at 45.
159. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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decrees in class actions may apply retroactively to persons within
the class when the complaint was filed. 160 Finally, Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is technically beneficial to
class action plaintiffs in that it ensures a more efficient and effec-




In selecting the best plaintiffs to represent the class, pris-
oner's attorney must consider the following factors. First, since
considerations of security are used by prison officials 'to justify
prison conditions, inmates with good disciplinary records should
be chosen to lead the class.' 62 Second, since many jurors will not
believe a convict's testimony, the most credible prisoners should
be used as witnesses. 163
Normally it is wise to select carefully a large number of de-
fendants as the class to be sued because of the attendant proce-
dural benefits. 64 For instance, a large defendant class often facil-
itates choice of venue, thereby enabling the attorney to proceed
in a favorable forum.' 65 Naming many defendants also facilitates
the discovery process. When a prison official is named as a de-
fendant he can be compelled to produce documents, submit to
depositions without subpoena, 6 and answer interrogatories.1 67
Ordinarily, witnesses are not amenable to such direct and inexpen-
sive discovery devices.
Care must be taken to select defendants that are actually rep-
resentative of their class. 168  The defendants also should be
named with a view towards facilitating the widest possible discov-
ery. When damages are sought, it is important that at least some
defendants are solvent and not protected by existing immuni-
160. See Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
161. Hirschkop lists the following aspects of a 23(a) action which render it
advantageous in prison litigation:
Because of the nature of prisons, the class will be easily definable
and so numerous as to render joinder of all parties impracticable. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(a). A class action will promulgate a more effective and
uniform relief, since all members of the class, hopefully all prisoners,
will benefit from a positive decision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
There can be no dismissal or compromise without the approval of the
court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). . . . Notice also provides an effective
means to discover prisoners' complaints as well as to secure evidence
suitable for trial.
Hirschkop, supra, at 45-46 n.35.
162. Hirschkop, supra, at 46.
163. Id.
164. id.
165. Id. at 46-47.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31, 34.
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ties.' 69 The attorney must also determine which individuals might
be more valuable to the plaintiffs not joined as defendants.170
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted
in 1966, has simplified the requirements for bringing a class ac-
tion. There are now four basic requirements for the maintenance
of a class action in federal court: (1) the class must be so numer-
ous that it is impractical to bring the individual members before
the court; (2) there must be questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) -the claims or defenses of the representative parties
must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)
the representative parties must be able to protect the interests of
the class fairly and adequately.'
71
Several additional requirements for class actions are indicated
in the Rules. First, it must appear that the maintenance of sepa-
rate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or im-
pede the ability of other members of the class to safeguard their
own interests. 72 Second, the party opposing the class must have
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable -to -the
class.'17  Third, the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class should predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members.' 74
Class actions asserting prisoner rights under the Civil Rights
Act should not be precluded by Preiser. Instead, where it can
be demonstrated that a class action is the only effective way to
obtain relief in a particular case, courts should uphold section 1983
jurisdiction. For instance, where inmates within a prison institu-
tion systematically are denied due process in parole-release hear-
ings, a class action suit would be proper. In this situation the
plaintiffs should argue that the policies behind the class action suit
would best vindicate the constitutional rights of -the class; section
1983 jurisdiction would follow derivatively.
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEEs
There has been an emerging trend among federal judges to
use their equitable powers to award "private attorney general"
fees in certain prison cases.' This trend infuses the class action
169. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
170. For instance, certain prison officials should not be named as defendants
so that they may remain available for negotiation regarding amelioration of
challenged conditions without the presence of defendants' attorneys.
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
172. Id. 23(b)(1)(A), (B).
173. Id. 23(b)(2).
174. Id. 23(b)(3).
175. See Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Perini,
357 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278
(M.D. Ala. 1972).
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prison suit with a fee-generating potential which will promote its
utility and effectiveness. A consideration of the importance of
awarding attorney's fees in prison litigation merits discussion of
recent, pertinent case law.
An award of attorney's fees in prison litigation strengthens
the inmate's right of access to the courts, a right concomitant with
the guarantee of due process of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Awards of attorney's fees in prison litigation
also promote the public's interest in the fair and humane operation
of those institutions which we have misnamed "correctional facili-
ties." It is necessary to encourage awards of fees in these cases
because the work of groups like -the American Civil Liberties
Union, legal aid, and prison societies, although constructive, has
been inadequate to effect the breadth and depth of prison re-
form needed in our nation today. The increased involvement of
individual attorneys in prison litigation would also eliminate the
forced dependence of the prison reform movement on limited gov-
ernment financing and private foundations. 76
The power of the federal courts to award attorney's fees in
prison cases is derived primarily from the common fund and im-
proper conduct theories. Under the common fund theory, attor-
ney's fees are awarded to an individual who has brought a suit
that has preserved or created a common fund which then becomes
available to a class of beneficiaries.' 77 The actual award is taken
out of the fund, so that the other beneficiaries will not have re-
ceived a "free ride" at the expense of the plaintiff. In the so-
called improper conduct cases attorney's fees have been awarded
where the defendant has engaged in fraudulent, groundless, op-
pressive or vexatious conduct. 178
Two relatively recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court have promoted the trend toward awarding attorney's fees
in public interest litigation. In Newman v. Piggie Park,'79 the Su-
preme Court upheld the award of reasonable attorney's fees under
Title II of ,the Civil Rights Act of 1964,180 which allows a federal
court discretionary authority to award such fees to the prevailing
party."' The Court in Piggie Park also suggested that this discre-
176. See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 301, 306-10 (1973).
177. Id. at 314.
178. Id. at 317.
179. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(2) (1970) prohibits discrimination in restaurants
which have dealings affecting interstate commerce.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) provides in relevant part:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
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tion should be exercised as the rule rather than the exception in
civil rights cases."' The Piggie Park decision thereby signaled
a readiness by the Supreme Court to award attorney's fees in pub-
lic interest litigation. The Court's rationale for making the award
was not simply to punish the defendant, but to encourage "private
attorneys general" to bring lawsuits for the constructive purpose
of advancing the public interest.18 3
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co."8 4 dealt with a successful
shareholders' derivative suit challenging a materially misleading
proxy statement, which violated section 14(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.185 Although other sections of the Act
provided for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party,8 6 section 14(a) did not. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court held that an attorney's fee award was proper under
the circumstances.187  The specific authorization, in certain sec-
tions of the Act, to grant such awards was found not to foreclose
similar awards in analogous situations. The Mills decision rein-
forced the theme advanced in Piggie Park that socially desirable
litigation should be encouraged. Mills goes further than Piggie
Park in that it awarded attorney's fees without specific statutory
authority.
Encouraged by the Supreme Court's increasing receptiveness
to the principle that attorney's fees should be awarded to success-
ful private plaintiffs who help -to further important public policies,
lower federal courts have broadened the scope of cases in which
awards are authorized. They have done this using several tech-
niques: (1) liberally interpreting statutory provisions authorizing
the award of attorney's fees; 8 8 (2) applying more broadly the ex-
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
182. 390 U.S. at 402.
183. Id.
184. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). For a detailed discussion of the Mills opinion,
see Note, The Allocation of Attorneys' Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 38 U. Ci. L. REV. 316 (1971).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
186. Sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the Act permit the award . . . of attorney's
fees to a party. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970).
187. 396 U.S. at 390.
188. See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Act construed as providing attorney's fees in test cases
as well as in cases where plaintiffs actually needed work); Parham v. Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (even when employee
did not establish right to damages, he was awarded attorney's fees where his
lawsuit prompted his employer to comply with the Civil Rights Act); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970) (plaintiffs awarded
attorney's fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as agents of
enforcement of national policy rather than as prevailing parties in damage suit).
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ceptions to the general rule against granting fees; 8 9 and (3)
awarding fees in contexts where even !the traditional exceptions
noted above are not applicable. 9 '
Indeed, federal courts recently have awarded attorney's fees
specifically in prisoners rights cases. In Gates v. Collier' the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's award
of nearly $42,000 in attorney's fees and $11,000 in costs and ex-
penses in a class action brought by inmates of the Mississippi State
Prison against the superintendant of the penitentiary, the mem-
bers of the state penitentiary board, and the governor of the state.
The district court's award was based on the improper conduct
theory-that the defendants were guilty of maintaining a defense
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for improper reasons.0 2
At least two other federal court decisions have awarded attor-
ney's fees in prison litigation cases. In Taylor v. Perini,' a civil
rights action was commenced which sought numerous reforms in
the operation and policies of the Marion Correctional Institute in
Ohio. After several years of litigation and negotiation, a consent
order was entered. The defendant was ordered to pay $21,-
055.07 to plaintiff's counsel as reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses and reasonable attorney's fees based upon services ren-
dered in the handling of this action.' Again, in Newman v.
Alabama'9a a federal district court awarded $14,483 to attorneys
for successfully prosecuting a class action civil rights suit to recover
damages for inadequate medical treatment of state prisoners.
Even where there is no statute authorizing the award of attor-
ney's fees, and traditional equitable doctrines allowing such an
award are not applicable, the Piggie Park-Mills doctrine suggests
that unless there is a specific statute prohibiting the award, the
courts should nevertheless award attorney's fees as a matter of
course to the successful plaintiff who has acted as a private attor-
ney general to vindicate the public interest. As this practice be-
189. See, e.g., Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court
had discretion to award fees to attorney for successful plaintiffs in suit for re-
covery for welfare payments, despite lack of provision for such award under state
law).
190. See, e.g., Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (attorneys'
fees awarded for successful injunction against justice courts hearing certain traffic
cases in which the justices had a pecuniary interest in convicting defendants);
Brewer v. School Board, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972) (attorneys' fees awarded in suit providing school children free busing,
although the pecuniary benefit extended could not be traced to a fund).
191. 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).
192. Id. at 300-01.
193. 359 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
194. Id. at 1187.
195. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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comes more common, the award of fees in such cases will serve
both as an incentive to members of the private bar to engage in
litigation involving important public issues, such as prison reform,
and as a deterrent -to future wrong-doing by prison officials and
their state government superiors.
CONCLUSION
In some areas the course of recent developments in prisoners'
rights litigation has been far-reaching and progressive, while in
other areas the law has remained regressive and tradition-bound.
Nevertheless, this author believes that prisoners' rights litigation
is gradually eroding the deeply ingrained injustices of our prison
system, although most of the work lies ahead.
Preiser v. Rodriguez""' could seriously impede federal judi-
cial review of state prison practices by imposing on complaining
inmates the burdensome, expensive and time-consuming exhaus-
tion-of-state-remedies requirement inherent in the habeas corpus
procedure. Given the elusive nature of the Preiser distinction be-
tween complaints challenging "conditions of confinement" or
treatment and those seeking "release" from confinement, the au-
thor strongly urges lower courts to adhere strictly to the limited
holding of Preiser and require prisoners to proceed under the
habeas corpus statute rather than section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act only when immediate release from state custody is the relief
sought. In particular, a section 1983 action should lie when a con-
victed person alleges a denial of due process in a parole-release
hearing, since immediate release would not result from a deter-
mination in plaintiff's favor.
In the wake of Preiser, prudent attorneys representing pris-
oners may be able to preserve section 1983 actions by carefully
limiting the terms of the relief sought and avoiding a request for
the prisoners outright release. Wingard v. North Carolina0 7 may
furnish the correct pleading formula to circumvent Preiser.1 8  A
claim for damages could also persuade a federal court to retain
a section 1983 claim which might otherwise be relegated to the
habeas corpus procedure.
The ever increasing use of class actions -to assert prisoners'
claims for damages and injunctive relief is a positive trend. Class
action suits are particularly well adapted to prison litigation and
constitute an efficient and effective means of enforcing the legal
rights of convicts. A major advantage of the class action under the
196. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
197. 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
198. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at least where the defendants are
carefully chosen, is the liberal discovery procedures provided in
the Rules.199
Finally, the increasing number of awards of attorney's fees
in prison cases by federal courts, particularly in class actions, is
a welcome trend which will further encourage the urgently needed
reform in our prison systems. Our society and legal system must
respond now to correct the human abuse and procedural inequities
which prevail in those institutions we have misleadingly labeled
"correctional facilities."
199. See note 157 and accompanying text supra.
